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Self-Government and the
Inalienability of Aboriginal Title
Kent McNeil'
Aboriginal title to land, as defined by the courts, has a
number of sui generis aspects. Prominent among these is its in-
alienability, other than by surrender to the Crown. Two expla-
nations are usually given for this: the need to protect Aboriginal
peoples from exploitation by unscrupulous European settlers,
and the incapacity of the settlers to obtain title to land otherwise
than by Crown grant.
While acknowledging that the need for protection of
Aboriginal lands was important historically, this article argues
that it is paternalistic to rely on this explanation for inalienabil-
ity today. The incapacity of settlers is a more satisfactory ra-
tionale for inalienability, both theoretically and doctrinally.
However, instead of basing that incapacity on the legally and
historically flawed view that settlers can only acquire lands
from the Crown, this article presents an explanation that is
based on the nature of Aboriginal title itself.
Aboriginal title is communal, and entails decision-
making authority vested in the Aboriginal nation that holds it
This authority, it is argued, is governmental in nature. It can
therefore only be acquired by a political entity that has equiva-
lent decision-making capacity, such as another Aboriginal na-
tion or the Crown. As subjects of the Crown, British settlers
have always lacked the capacity to acquire a title that has a
governmental dimension. Explained in this way, inalienability
only prevents Aboriginal nations from transferring Aboriginal
title itself to private purchasers. It should not preclude the crea-
tion of lesser private interests by Aboriginal nations, as long as
they retain their Aboriginal title. As a result, inalienability
should not be an impediment to the economic development of
Aboriginal tide lands.
Le titre foncier autochtone, tel que d~fini par les tribunaux,
possise n certain nombre d'aspects sui generis. Pari eux se
trouve son caractre inalienable, antre que par cession t la Cou-
ronne. Deux explications sent habitoellement avancdes relative-
ment Ai cette particularit: le besoin de protger les peuples an-
tochtones de l'exploitation par certains colonisateurs europens
malhonntes, et l'incapacit6 de ces demiers d'obtenir un titre fon-
cier autrement que par one concession de la Couronse.
Tout en reconsaissant l'importance historique du besoin
de protger les teres autochtones, cet article affleme qu'il est
aujourd'hui patemaliste de se baser sur cette explication pour
justifier leur caraettre inali6nable. L'incapacit6 des colonisa-
teurs offre un raisonsement beaucoup pins satisfaisant t cet
6gard, et ce tant au niveau thtorique que doctrinal. Cependant,
plut& que de baser cette incapacitd sur l'ide--ltgalement et
historiquement fausse---selon laquelle les colonisateurs ne pou-
vaient acqurir de titre foncier que par la Couronne, cet article
prdsente une explication base sur Ia nature meme du titre fon-
cier autochtone.
Le titre foncier autochtone est de nature communautaire,
impliquant une autorit6 dcisionnelle investie dans Ia nation
autochtone qui le d6tient. Cette autorit, affirne-t-on, est de
nature gouvemementale. Elle ne peut done 6tre acquise que par
une entit6 politique ayant ne capacit6 dtcisionnelle dquiva-
ente, tel qu'une autre nation autochtone ou Ia Couronne. Or, A
titre de sujets de la couroone, les colonisateurs anglais ont tou-
jours manqu6 cette capacit d'acqudrir un titre foncier ayant
cette dimension gouvemementale. Explique de cette manire,
l'inalidnabilit6 empcherait seulement les nations autochtones
de transftrer les tites fonciers h des acheteurs privds. Cela ne
devrait done pas dcarter la crtation d'intrts privds moindres
par les nations autochtones, dans Ia mesure cependant oil olles
conservent leur titre foncier. Par constquent, le caractare inali-
nable de leur titre no devrait pas glner le dtveloppement 6co-
nomique des territoires autochtones.
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Introduction
The inalienability of Aboriginal title, other than by surrender to the Crown, is a
central tenet of the common law. This rule has been affirmed repeatedly by courts in
leading decisions in Canada,' Australia,2 and New Zealand? Indian title has also been
held to be inalienable in the United States,' where after the American Revolution it
could only be extinguished by the federal government.' But what is the basis for this
restriction on alienation? Did it originate from British colonial policy that was eventu-
ally incorporated into the common law, or are there more fundamental doctrinal or
theoretical justifications for it?
When the rule against alienation of Aboriginal title is traced back to the original
British colonies in North America, one discovers considerable confusion over the va-
lidity of private purchases of Indian lands.' In the American colonies, the matter was
initially dealt with by locally enacted legislation! By at least the middle of the eight-
' See e.g. Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 320-22 (Judson J.), 377-79, 381-
85 (Hall J., dissenting), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 [hereinafter Calder cited to S.C.R.]; Guerin v. R., [1984] 2
S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 55 N.R. 161 [hereinafter Guerin cited to S.C.R.]; Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193,22 N.R. 161 [hereinafter Delgamuukw
cited to S.C.R.]; Skeetchesin Indian Band v. British Columbia (Registrar of Land Titles), [2000] 2
C.N.L.R. 330 at 336, 338-39 (B.C. S.C.), aff'd [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 310 (B.C. C.A.); Chippewas of
Sarnia Band v. Canada (A.G.) (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 641, 195 D.L.R. (4th) 135, [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 56(C.A.) [hereinafter Chippewas of Sarnia cited to D.L.R.]; Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town of)
(2001), 206 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at paras. 42,46,2001 SCC 85, Iacobucci J.
2 Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (H.C. Austl.) [hereinafter Mabo]; Mason v.
Tritton (1994), 34 N.S.W.L.R. 572 at 583-84 (C.A.), Kirby P.; Commonwealth v. Yarmirr (1999), 168
A.L.R. 426 at 435 (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ.), 496 (Merkel J., dissenting in part) (Full F.C.)
[hereinafter Yarmirr].
3 R. v. Symonds (1847), [1840-1932] N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (S.C.) [hereinafter Symonds]; Nireaha Tamaki
v. Baker, [1901] A.C. 561 at 576, 579 (P.C.). In New Zealand, inalienability is usually described in
terms of the Crown's "right of pre-emption" of Maori lands. See Wallis v. Solicitor-General for New
Zealand, [1903] A.C. 173 at 179, 187-88 (PC.), and discussion in P. McHugh, The Maori Magna
Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1991) at
78-80, 101-04,321-22.
' See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 (1823); United States v. Paine
Lumber, 206 U.S. 467,27 S. Ct 697 (1907) [hereinafter Paine Lumber].3 See especially Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 24 L. Ed. 440 (1877); United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339, 62 S. Ct. 248 (1941); Oneida (County ol v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226, 105 S. Ct 1245 (1985).6 For more detailed discussion, see K. McNeil, Common Lmv Aboriginal itle (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989) at 221-35.
7 See R.H. Akagi, The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies: A Study of Their Develop-
ment, Organization, Activities and Controversies, 1620-1770 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
2001] 475
476 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 47
eenth century, the imperial government in Westminster had adopted a policy forbid-
ding these purchases, expression of which can be found in instructions to various co-
lonial governors.' This policy was applied generally across British North America by
the Royal Proclamation of 1763.'
Although judges have often referred to the Royal Proclamation when affirming
the inalienability of Aboriginal title,'" it is nonetheless clear that a common law basis
for the rule exists as well. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, the leading American case on the
issue, Chief Justice Marshall gave three reasons for holding private purchases of In-
dian lands to be invalid, the last and apparently least important of which was a viola-
tion of the Royal Proclamation." In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada re-
peated the standard view that Aboriginal title is inalienable other than by surrender to
the Crown, without reference to the Royal Proclamation in that context.'2 In Australia,
nia Press, 1924) at 22-30; W.C. MacLeod, The American Indian Frontier (London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner, 1928) at 196-207; M. Harris, Origin of the Land Tenure System in the United States
(Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1953) at 157-70.
8 See "Lords of Trade to the Governor of New York" (18 September 1753) in E.B. O'Callaghan,
ed., Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York, vol. 4 (Albany: Weed, Par-
sons, 1853-87) 854, and instructions to the governors of New York (1755), Virginia (1756), and sev-
eral other colonies (1761), in L.W. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors,
1670-1776, vol. 2 (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1935) at 671, 687.
' (U.K.), 3 Geo. UTI, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1. See B. Slattery, The Land Rights of In-
digenous Canadian Peoples as Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of Their Territories (D.Phil. the-
sis, Oxford University, 1979) at 310-12; J. Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763
and an Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa: Research Branch, Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada, 1981) at 355-71.
'0 See e.g. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 53-55
(P.C.); Guerin, supra note 1 at 376-83, Dickson J.
" Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4. See section I1.C, below. One possible reason why the Royal
Proclamation has not been given much prominence by American courts is that it was a prerogative
document issued by George I, partly intended to contain the westward expansion of the colonies on
the East Coast. On the relationship of the Royal Proclamation and the 1774 Quebec Act (14 Geo. UI,
c. 83, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 2) to the American Revolution, see J.M. Sosin, Whitehall
and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1961). According to a prominent Indian law scholar in the United States, "In almost
two hundred years of American legal history, the Proclamation has been cited by the United States
Supreme Court only eleven times, and usually only as a passing historical reference"; R.N. Clinton,
"The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the
Management of Indian Affairs" (1989) 69 B.U.L. Rev. 329 at 367.
'2 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 113 (Lamer C.J.C.), para. 190 (La Forest J.). See also
Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 119 at para. 152, 147 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 211 N.R.
241 [hereinafter Opetchesaht Indian Band], where Major J. said that "Both the common law and the
Indian Act guard against the erosion of the native land base through conveyances by individual band
members or by any group of members" [emphasis added]. In Calder, supra note 1, the Court had split
evenly on the question of whether the Royal Proclamation even applies in British Columbia. In Del-
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where the Royal Proclamation does not apply, the High Court in Mabo accepted
without question that Native title (as Aboriginal title is called there) cannot be trans-
ferred out of the Indigenous community to which it pertains.'3 In New Zealand, the
1840 Treaty of Waitangi between the Maori chiefs and Britain assured the Crown of a
right of pre-emption of Maori lands; nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in Sy-
monds that the common law would have prevented settlers from acquiring those lands
directly."
4
Given that the general prohibition against alienation of Aboriginal, Indian, Native,
and Maori title has a common law basis, it is worth considering legal justifications for
the rule. As we shall see, two rationales are usually given: first, the need to protect In-
digenous peoples from unscrupulous European settlers, and second, the incapacity of
the settlers to acquire lands other than by Crown grant.'" It will be argued that the first
rationale is derived from a British colonial policy that, whatever its justification his-
torically, is paternalistic and acts as an impediment to the economic development of
Indigenous lands today. However, the second rationale is rooted in principle and has
the potential to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between Indige-
nous land rights and self-government. Moreover, this rationale can be used to provide
jurisdictional space for Indigenous peoples to rely on their own laws to govern the al-
ienability of land rights within their territories, thereby facilitating the economic de-
velopment of their lands without surrendering them to the Crown. The second ration-
ale will be the main focus of this article, but first let us briefly consider the protection
rationale.
I. The Protection Rationale
There can be no doubt that part of the motivation behind the British North Ameri-
can policy of prohibiting private purchases of Indian lands was the protection of In-
dian nations. The Royal Proclamation stated expressly that the reason why only the
Crown could purchase Indian lands was that "great Frauds and Abuses have been
committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests,
ganuukw, while the British Columbia Court of Appeal (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470, held that it does
not apply there, this issue was not addressed directly by the Supreme Court. See La Forest J.'s discus-
sion of the proclamation (Delgamuukw, ibiL at paras. 200, 203). See also Lamer C.J.C.'s discussion
(Delgamuukav, ibid. at paras. 61, 67, 114).
," Mabo, supra note 2 at 59-60, 70 (Brennan J.), 88, 110 (Deane and Gaudron JJ.), 194 (Toohey J.).
This aspect of the Mabo decision will be discussed below, text accompanying notes 143-50.4 Symonds, supra note 3 at 388-90 (Chapman J.), 393-96 (Martin CJ.).
'" A third, related rationale is occasionally mentioned, namely "the Crown's desire to control settle-
ment": Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 1 at 168. See generally Sosin, supra note 11. See also the dis-
cussion of Martin CJ's judgment in Symonds, ibid, in text accompanying notes 44-48.
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and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians."'" The proclamation also stated that
it was
just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of our Colo-
nies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are con-
nected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed
in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having
being ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as
their Hunting Grounds."
The protection of the Indian nations from frauds and abuses therefore went hand in
hand with the Crown's interests, in particular the security of its North American colo-
nies.'"
Canadian case law has accepted the protection explanation for the inalienability
of Aboriginal title. For example, in Guerin, Dickson J. said that the provision in the
Indian Ac"' for surrender of reserve lands to the Crown goes back to the Royal Proc-
lamation, confirming the "historic responsibility which the Crown has undertaken, to
act on behalf of the Indians so as to protect their interests in transactions with third
parties."" In Canadian Pacific v. Paul, a unanimous Court said that "[t]his feature of
inalienability was adopted as a protective measure for the Indian population lest they
be persuaded into improvident transactions."" Similarly, in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian
Band, La Forest J. said that
16 Supra note 9 at 6. While the Royal Proclamation provided that Indian lands could also be pur-
chased in the name of proprietary governments, the authority of those governments came from the
Crown. See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1765-69) at 108, where proprietary governments are described as having been "granted out by the
crown to individuals, in the nature of feudatory principalities, with all the inferior regalities, and sub-
ordinate powers of legislation, which formerly belonged to the owners of counties-palatine: yet still
with these express conditions, that the ends for which the grant was made be substantially pursued,
and that nothing be attempted which may derogate from the sovereignty of the mother-country." See
also Pen[n] v. Lord Baltimore (1745), Ridg. T. H. 332,27 E.R. 847 (Ch.).
" Supra note 9 at 5. For further evidence of the protection rationale and discussion of this aspect of
the Royal Proclamation, see Slattery, supra note 9 at 192-93, 199-203; Stagg, supra note 9 at 356-70.
" News of the outbreak of Pontiac's War in the spring of 1763 had no doubt reached London by the
summer, heightening the need to provide security measures to the colonies by pacifying the Indian
nations. See Slattery, ibid. at 200-201; Sosin, supra note 11 at 64-78.
"R.S.C. 1952, c. 149, now R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
20 Guerin, supra note 1 at 383; see also Estey J. (ibid. at 392).
"[1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 487 [hereinafter Paul cited to S.C.R.]. See also Blue-
berry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development),
[19951 4 S.C.R. 344 at paras. 33-35, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 190 N.R. 89, McLachlin J. [hereinafter
Blueberry River Indian Band].
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legislative restraints on the alienability of Indian lands are but the continuation
of a policy that has shaped the dealings between the Indians and the European
settlers since the time of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. ... The sections of the
Indian Act relating to the inalienability of Indian lands seek to give effect to this
protection by interposing the Crown between the Indians and the market forces
which, if left unchecked, had the potential to erode Indian ownership of these
reserve lands."
These decisions all emphasize the historic policy basis of protecting Aboriginal title
lands by making them inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown.'
In Delgamuukw, the leading case on Aboriginal title in Canada, Chief Justice
Lamer affirmed that both protection and settler incapacity are behind the inalienability
of Aboriginal title. He said:
Alienation would bring to an end the entitlement of the aboriginal people to oc-
cupy the land and would terminate their relationship with it. I have suggested
above that the inalienability of aboriginal lands is, at least in part, a function of
the common law principle that settlers in colonies must derive their title from
Crown grant and, therefore, cannot acquire title through purchase from abo-
riginal inhabitants. It is also, again only in part, a function of a general policy
"to ensure that Indians are not dispossessed of their entitlements" ... What the
inalienability of lands held pursuant to aboriginal title suggests is that those
lands are more than just a fungible commodity. The relationship between an
aboriginal community and the lands over which it has aboriginal title has an
important non-economic component. The land has an inherent and unique
value in itself, which is enjoyed by the community with aboriginal title to it.
The community cannot put the land to uses which would destroy that value.24
Lamer C.J.C. thus linked inalienability to an inherent limit he placed on Aboriginal
title lands that prevents them from being used in ways that are irreconcilable with the
attachment to the land that forms the basis for the title.' Apparently, both are intended
to preserve the lands for future generations, 6 which is another way of expressing the
protection rationale. To the extent that the inherent limit and inalienability are de-
signed to prevent Aboriginal title holders from acting against their own best interests,
[199012 S.C.R. 85 at 129-30, 133, 141, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 110 N.R. 241 [hereinafter Mitchell
cited to S.C.R.].
" See also Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 1, esp. at 164, 168.
4 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 129 [reference omitted]. See also Delgamuukw, ibid at para.
113, where Lamer CJ. described inalienability as one of the sui generis dimensions of Aboriginal ti-
tle. La Forest J. expressed the same view (ibid at para. 190). See also Hopton v. Pamajewon (1993),
16 O.R. (3d) 390 at 398-400, 109 D.L.R. (4th) 449 (C.A.) [hereinafter Hopton]; Opetchesaht Indian
Band, supra note 12 at para. 38, Major J.
25DelganuuLiv, ibid. at paras. 125-32.
6 See ibid. at para. 128, regarding the inherent limit.
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however, they contain an element of paternalism that may not be acceptable in mod-
em Canadian society."
Looking beyond North America, we can see that the protection rationale has been
used in other jurisdictions to justify the inalienability of Indigenous land rights. In
New Zealand, for example, Chapman J. observed that the exclusive right of the Crown
to extinguish Maori title
necessarily arises out of our peculiar relations with the Native race, and out of
our obvious duty of protecting them, to as great an extent as possible, from the
evil consequences of the intercourse to which we have introduced them, or
have imposed upon them. To let in all purchasers, and to protect and enforce
every private purchase, would be virtually to confiscate the lands of the Natives
in a very short time."
For Chapman J., however, the protection rationale seems to have been based more on
principles of morality than of law.29 As we shall see, the main legal reason both he and
Martin C.J. gave for the inalienability of Maori title was the incapacity of settlers to
acquire it without the intercession of the Crown.'
Historically, the paternalism inherent in the protection rationale for the inal-
ienability of Aboriginal title may have been justified. Differences between Indigenous
peoples' relationships with the land and European conceptions of land ownership no
doubt resulted in a lack of mutual understanding when transactions took place be-
tween Indigenous people and European settlers.' This in turn led to exploitation, the
27 On the paternalism behind the inherent limit, see K. McNeil, "The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and
Content of Aboriginal Title" in K. McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Can-
ada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 102 at 116-22
[hereinafter McNeil, "Nature and Content"]. It is also important to note that neither inalienability nor
the inherent limit diminish the status of Aboriginal title as a property right (see ibid., esp. at 108-11,
116-22, 127-34).
" Symonds, supra note 3 at 391. See also Mabo, supra note 2 at 194, where Toohey J. found support
for the protection rationale in Chapman J.'s judgment. While the protection rationale has not been
given prominence in Australian jurisprudence (no doubt because there was no equivalent of the North
American policy of protection that found expression in the Royal Proclamation of 1763), it was relied
upon by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg, as a reason for denying the validity of John Batman's
1835 purchase of land from Indigenous people in the Port Phillip region of what is now Victoria. See
McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 224-25.
29 "From the protective character of the rule, then, it is entitled to respect on moral grounds, no less
than to judicial support on strictly legal grounds" (Symonds, ibid.).
o See text accompanying notes 40-50.
3, On these differences, see L. Little Bear, "Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian 'Grundnorm"' in
J.R. Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart, 1986) 243; W. Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New
England (New York: Hill & Wang, 1983) at 54-81; Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Abo-
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kind of frauds and abuses that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was designed to pre-
vent." But while there may have been good reasons for this policy of protection in the
past, one may ask whether a restriction on alienation that is based on paternalism is
acceptable today. Nevertheless, it is of vital importance for Indigenous peoples to pre-
serve the small land bases that they have managed to retain.3 Inalienability is still an
important means of ensuring that more of the lands they hold in common are not
lost.' For this reason, there is value in a justification for inalienability that does not
rely on paternalism. The incapacity of settlers rationale meets this need. Properly un-
derstood, it supports the status of Indigenous nations as self-governing political enti-
ties with control over their communally owned lands and natural resources.
IL Incapacity of Settlers and the Political Aspect of Aboriginal Title
A. Jurisprudential Explanations
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer said that "the inalienability of aboriginal
lands is, at least in part, a function of the common law principle that settlers in colo-
nies must derive their title from Crown grant and, therefore, cannot acquire title
through purchase from aboriginal inhabitants"' One problem with this is that the no-
tion that settlers could only acquire title to land by Crown grant is inconsistent with
riginal Peoples, vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Can-
ada, 1996) at 424-64 [hereinafter RCAP Report].
"See above note 16 and accompanying text.
In its report, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended that the land base of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada be increased in order "to facilitate Aboriginal economic self-reliance,
cultural autonomy and self-government": RCAP Report, supra note 31 at 574. Moreover, as mainte-
nance of Indigenous land bases is probably essential to cultural preservation, emerging international
norms may classify and protect "Aboriginal rights as inalienable human rights". See P. Joffe, "Na-
tional Implications and Potential Effects in Qu6bec" in 0. Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: Na-
tional Implications of the Supreme Court's Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000)
295 at 307-10. In some instances, the laws of Indigenous peoples themselves may also make their
lands inalienable, even by surrender to the Crown. See K. McNeil, 'Extinguishment of Aboriginal
Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion" Ottawa L. Rev. [forthcoming] [herein-
after McNeil, "Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title"].
" In the United States, sale of "surplus" Indian lands and conversion of tribal lands into individual
holdings that became alienable after a certain time had a disastrous impact on the Indian nations,
causing loss of almost two-thirds of their lands in the period when this allotment policy was in place
from 1887 to 1934. See D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, ed. by R
Prucha (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973); EE. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign
to Assimilate Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); C.F. Wilkinson,
American Indians, 7ime and the Law: Native Societies in a Modem Constitutional Democracy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) at 19-23.
'Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 129; see above note 24 and accompanying text.
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both practice and precedent in many British colonies. On Pitcairn Island, for example,
it appears that the settlers (who were actually the Bounty mutineers and their Polyne-
sian companions) did acquire lands for themselves by occupancy that gave rise to
valid legal titles without Crown grants. 6 Similarly, in British Honduras (now Belize),
British subjects occupied lands and acquired good titles against the Crown, by posses-
sion and statutory limitation." In British West Africa and India, Englishmen were able
to purchase lands directly from the local inhabitants." Closer to home in what used to
be New France, British subjects could acquire lands from the French Canadians, ap-
parently without the intercession of the Crown.'
In Symonds, the New Zealand Supreme Court provided more detailed explana-
tions of why the British settlers there were unable to acquire Maori lands for them-
selves. Chapman J. held that this "restraint upon the purchasing capacity of the
Queen's European subjects" originated from the corollary of the doctrine of tenures
that "the Queen is the exclusive source of private title.' He elaborated as follows:
" See McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 147-57.
'7See Attorney-General for British Honduras v. Bristowe (1880), 6 App. Cas. 143 (P.C.), and dis-
cussion in McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal 7itle, ibid. at 141-47.
"' For West Africa, see K. Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law: An Exposition, Analysis and Critique
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964) at 44-48, 60-65; R.W. James & A.B. Kasunmu, Alienation of
Family Property in Southern Nigeria (Ibadan, Nigeria: ibadan University Press, 1966) at 84-91; A.
Allott, New Essays in African Law (London: Butterworths, 1970) at 298-338. For India, see Freeman
v. Fairlie (1828), 1 Moo. Ind. App. 305, 18 E.R. 117 (Ch.); Mayor of the City of Lyons v. East India
Company (1836), 1 Moo. PC. 175, 12 E.R. 782; K.M. Chatterjea, The Law Relating to the Transfer of
Immoveable Property Inter ivos (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, 1890) at 139-40.
'9 See Drulard v. Welsh (1906), 11 O.L.R. 647 (Div. Ct.), reversed on other grounds (1907), 14
O.L.R. 54 (C.A.). Provisions of both the 1760 Articles of Capitulation of Montreal (art. 35) and the
1763 Treaty of Paris (art. 4) provided expressly that French Canadians who decided to return to
France or emigrate could sell their property to British subjects, see Corinthe v. Sdminaire de Saint-
Sulpice (1911), 21 B.R. 316 (Qc.), aff'd [1912] A.C. 872 (P.C.). These provisions, however, do not
appear to have extended to French Canadians who chose to remain in Canada. See also the Quebec
Act, supra note 11, s. 10, providing that persons who owned lands that they had a right to alienate in-
ter vivos could leave those lands by will, "any Law, Usage, or Custom, heretofore or now prevailing in
the Province, to the contrary hereof in any-wise notwithstanding." So the alienability of French Cana-
dian lands (which both the Drulard and the Corinthe decisions seem to have accepted) would pre-
sumably have been due to French law (this is at least implicit in s. 10 of the Quebec Act) and the
common law capacity of British subjects to purchase those lands. In other words, the land rights of
the French Canadians were treated as private property, whereas the land rights of the Indian nations
were not. See the references to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (issued less than eight months after
the Treaty of Paris was signed) supra notes 9, 16-18 and accompanying text.
4' Symonds, supra note 3 at 391, 388. Note that Chapman J. acknowledged that this is subject to the
"rules of prescription" (ibid. at 388).
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Any acquisition of territory by a subject, by conquest, discovery, occupation, or
purchase from Native tribes (however it may entitle the subject, conqueror, dis-
coverer, or purchaser, to gracious consideration from the Crown) can confer no
right on the subject. Territories therefore, acquired by the subject in any way
vest at once in the Crown. To state the Crown's right in the broadest way: it
enjoys the exclusive right of acquiring newly found or conquered territory, and
of extinguishing the title of the aboriginal inhabitants to be found thereon. ....
The rule, therefore, adopted in our colonies, "that the Queen has the exclusive
right of extinguishing Native title to land" is only one member of a wider rule,
that the Queen has the exclusive right of acquiring new territory, and that what-
soever the subject may acquire, vests at once, as already stated, in the Queen.




What is particularly interesting about this passage is the way it links title to land and
territorial sovereignty. 2 In Chapman J.'s view, the two went hand in hand in the colo-
nial context of New Zealand. The settlers could not acquire title to land for themselves
because they could not acquire territory. As British subjects, they lacked the capacity
to acquire personally that which could only pertain to a sovereign.
Chief Justice Martin, in arriving at the same conclusion in Symonds as Chapman
J., probed deeper in search of the principle behind the rule that in the colonies British
subjects could only acquire title to land from the Crown. He stated the underlying
principle in this way: "[C]olonization is a work of national concernment, a work to be
carried on with reference to the interests of the nation collectively; and therefore to be
controlled and guided by the Supreme Power of the nation" While acknowledging
the feudal origins of the rule that the Crown is the source of all titles to land within its
common law dominions,' he pointed out that it is now understood that Crown lands
4' IbidL at 389-90.
"
2 While these are distinct concepts, the feudal foundation of the common law has caused them to be
intertwined where the rights and authority of the Crown are concerned. See McNeil, Common Law
Aboriginal 7itle, supra note 6 at 108-10.
"3 There would, however, be nothing to prevent British subjects from acquiring lands by purchase
from the "natives" in other jurisdictions, such as France, where territorial sovereignty was not an is-
sue. In other words, it was the colonial context of New Zealand and the fact that there was more at
stake than private property that placed restrictions on the capacity of the settlers to acquire lands.
Moreover, contrary to what Chapman L said, it appears that British subjects could acquire lands for
themselves in regions colonized by Britain as long as they did so before the Crown asserted sover-
eignty. See the discussion of British Honduras and Pitcairn Island in McNeil, Common Law Aborigi-
nal Title, ibid. at 141-57.
Symonds, supra note 3 at 395.
' As we have seen, it is not entirely accurate to say that the Crown is the source of all titles, see su-
pra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Even in England, the dogma that all private titles to land
originated from Crown grants is generally acknowledged to be a legal fiction. See Blackstone, supra
note 16, vol. 2,51; J. Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative
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are to be administered for the national benefit. Consequently, when Native inhabitants
of New Zealand ceded land to British subjects, the right acquired was "not the right of
any individual subject of the Crown, not even of the person by whom the cession was
procured, but the right of the Crown on behalf of the whole nation, on behalf of the
whole body of subjects of the Crown."' Linking this to territorial sovereignty in much
the same way as Chapman J. had done, Martin C.J. said:
If a subject of the Crown could by his own act, unauthorized by the Crown, ac-
quire against the Crown a right to any portion of the lands of a new country, it
is plain that he might, acting upon that right, proceed to form a colony there.
Now, the law of England denies to any subject the right of forming a Colony
without the license of the Crown. And when we consider the complicated re-
sponsibilities which flow out of the existence of a colony, and which may seri-
ously affect the power to which the settlers owe allegiance, and from which
they expect to receive protection, and when we also estimate the means and
appliances needed for successful colonization, that denial can scarcely fail to
appear reasonable and necessary."
So for Chief Justice Martin, like Chapman J., the incapacity of settlers to acquire
Maori lands for themselves was derived from the common law rule that British sub-
jects who owe allegiance to the Crown cannot acquire territory for themselves.' This
rule is based in part on the British nation's public interest in controlling and benefiting
from the acquisition of lands in colonial contexts. As was already apparent from our
analysis of Chapman J.'s judgment, there is clearly more at stake here than private
property.
We have seen that Chapman J. and Martin C.J. both approached the issue of the
inalienability of Maori lands from the vantage point of the common law status and
capacity of settlers. Neither of them said much about the nature of Maori title to land,
as that issue was not before them." However, the connection they made between the
Duties and Rights of the Subject (London: Joseph Butterworth & Son, 1820) at 211; McNeil, Com-
mon Law Aboriginal itle, supra note 6 at 82-84.
' Symonds, supra note 3 at 396.47 Ibid. at 395 [emphasis added].
" This rule is well established. See Re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211 at 221 (P.C.); Chitty,
supra note 45 at 30; C.J. Tarring, Chapters on the Law Relating to the Colonies, 4th ed. (London:
Stevens & Haynes, 1913) at 23; K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stev-
ens & Sons, 1966) at 100. Sarawak, which although ceded to a British subject in 1841-42 was not ac-
quired by the Crown until 1946, is regarded by the last two authors as an anomaly. See also Tan Sri
Datuk Lee Hun Hoe, "Legal History of Sarawak" [1977] 2 Malayan L.J. ms lviii.
Chapman J. did say that "[t]he legal doctrine as to the exclusive right of the Queen to extinguish
the Native title ... is no doubt incompatible with that full and absolute dominion over the lands which
they occupy, which we call an estate in fee"; Symonds, supra note 3 at 391. He evidently assumed that
alienability is a fundamental attribute of a fee simple estate. This does not appear to be correct. Ap-
parently the Crown can grant an inalienable fee simple, see Chitty, supra note 45 at 386, n. (h); J.C.
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settlers' incapacity to acquire Maori lands and their incapacity to engage in coloniza-
tion has important implications for Maori title. When Britain acquired territory from a
European sovereign, such as France, there does not seem to have been any restriction
on the ability of British subjects to acquire lands in that territory that were already
owned by individuals. Those lands were regarded as private property, and so were al-
ienable as such.' However, when Britain acquired sovereignty over a territory like
New Zealand that was occupied by Indigenous peoples, British subjects could not
obtain lands directly from them because acquisition of Indigenous lands, according to
Martin C.J., was part of the colonizing enterprise. It therefore seems that the lands of
Indigenous peoples cannot be equated with private property; they have a public aspect
and so have to be acquired by the Crown before they can be transformed into private
property by Crown grant.
Since Symonds was decided in 1847, the law of Native or Aboriginal title has un-
dergone extensive development, especially in Canada and Australia.' An important
element of that development has been the confirmation of the communal nature of
such title. In Mabo, the High Court of Australia held that the Meriam People have
communal Native title to lands on the Murray Islands, even though their traditional
laws and customs contain no concept of community title, as in their legal system all
land belongs to individuals and groups." Although Brennan J. (as he then was) said
that "Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws ac-
knowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of
a territory,""5 the court went on to declare that "the Meriam people are entitled as
against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of
the Murray Islands."' Brennan J. said that this kind of "proprietary community title"
could co-exist with "individual non-proprietary rights that are derived from the com-
Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property (Boston: Soule & Bugbee, 1883) at 11, n. 1. Moreover,
in Pierce Bell Sales Pty. v. Frazer (1973), 130 C.L.R. 575 at 584 (H.C. Austl.), Barwick C.J. said that
a statutory restraint on alienation of land granted by the Crown would not reduce, or make condi-
tional, the fee simple estate obtained by the grantee.
:0See above note 39 and accompanying text.
' In the United States, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall had already laid down the
parameters for Indian title and tribal sovereignty in Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4, and Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832), to be discussed further in text accompanying
notes 109-42. These decisions influenced Chapman J. and Martin C.J. in the Symonds case.
52 Mabo, supra note 2 at 22, Brennan J. For detailed discussion of the implications of this, see K.
McNeil, "The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the Existence and Content of Native
Title at Common Law" in K McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and
Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Centre, 2001) 416, esp. at 418-23 [herein-
after McNeil, "Traditional Laws and Customs"].
"Mabo, ibid. at 58.
" Ibid. at 217 [italics removed].
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munity's laws and customs and are dependent on the community title,' and that, "[a]
fortiori, there can be no impediment to the recognition of individual proprietary
rights." 6 Moreover, an Indigenous people's laws and customs, and so the nature of
their intra-community land rights, could be modified after British colonization." This
presupposes the existence of community authority that must be governmental in na-
ture." It appears, therefore, that Native title involves a relationship between the Crown
and an Indigenous people that is not merely proprietary." While their communal title
obviously has a proprietary aspect, it also has social, cultural, and political dimensions
that are beyond the scope of standard conceptions of private property.
Likewise in Canada, the decision of the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw contains
a concept of Aboriginal title that has a governmental quality.' In his discussion of the
unique elements of Aboriginal title, Chief Justice Lamer said:
A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally.
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it is a collec-
tive right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with
respect to that land are also made by that community. This is another feature of




Ibid. at 61, 70 (Brennan J.), 110 (Deane and Gaudron JJ.), 192 (Toohey J.).
56 It might be argued that the modifications to Indigenous laws and customs that the High Court en-
visaged could occur without conscious decision-making on the part of Indigenous communities. This
argument is reminiscent McEachem C.J.'s discredited trial judgment in Delgamuukw v. British Co-
lumbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, esp. at 441, 3 W.W.R. 97 (B.C. S.C.), where he said he did not
accept that the ancestors of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en "behaved as they did because of 'institu-
tions'; instead, he found that "they more likely acted as they did because of survival instincts which
varied from village to village" [emphasis added]. For critical commentary, see M. Asch, 'Errors in
Delgamuukw: An Anthropological Perspective" in F Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal litle in British Colum-
bia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books, 1992) 221; D. Culhane, The
Pleasure of the Crown: Anthropology, Law and First Nations (Bumaby, B.C.: Talon Books, 1998).
" See J. Webber, "Beyond Regret: Mabo's Implications for Australian Constitutionalism" in D. Ivi-
son, P. Patton & W. Sanders, eds., Political Theory and the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 60.
' For further discussion, see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Ter-
ritorial Sovereignty" (1998) 5 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 253, esp. at 285-91; McNeil, "Nature and
Content", supra note 27.
61 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 115 [emphasis in original]. See also R. v. Marshall, [19991 3
S.C.R. 533 at para. 17, 179 D.L.R. (4th) 193, where the Supreme Court said that treaty rights to hunt
and fish "do not belong to the individual, but are exercised by authority of the local [Aboriginal]
community to which the accused belongs."
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Commenting on this aspect of the Delgamuukw decision in Campbell v. British Co-
lumbia, Williamson J. concluded that the right of a community to make decisions re-
garding the use of its land includes "the right to have a political structure for making
those decisions.' '2 Moreover, that Aboriginal title is "a collective right held by all
members of an aboriginal nation" suggests that Aboriginal nations as such have the
capacity to own land and therefore have legal personality.3 As Aboriginal nations
have decision-making authority over their lands that is governmental, they cannot be
equated with natural persons or private corporations. Nor are they like municipal cor-
porations, which are created by statute. Their legal personality, like that of the Crown
itself, is both inherent and public, arising from their existence as nations, and it in-
cludes political authority.' At common law, an Aboriginal nation can therefore be
conceptualized as the aggregate of its members,'5 a legal and political body which
holds Aboriginal title in a way that is both proprietary and governmental.'
The recent Mabo and Delgamuukw pronouncements on the nature of Native or
Aboriginal title make more understandable the Symonds court's connection between
"2 [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 at 30, 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333 (B.C. S.C.). See also Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1
S.C.R. 911, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 385, where Binnie J. (for himself and Major J.) envisaged the possibility
of Aboriginal self-government to the extent that it is compatible with Canadian sovereignty.
"3 For further discussion, see McNeil, "Nature and Content', supra note 27 at 122-25.
The Crown is a corporation sole that owes its legal personality to its status as the titular head of
state, see F Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence (London: Macmillan, 1896) at 113. EW. Malt-
land, in his incisive essay '"he Crown as Corporation" in H.D. Hazeltine, G. Lapsley & PH.
Winfield, eds., Frederic William Maitland: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1936) 104 at 106-07, observed:
[Miedieval thought conceived the nation as a community and pictured it as a body of
which the king was the head. It resembled those smaller bodies which it comprised and
of which it was in some sort composed. What we should regard as the contrast between
State and Corporation was hardly visible. The "commune of the realm" differed rather
in size and power than in essence from the commune of a county or the commune of a
borough.
See also E.H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1971) at 17-24.
65 In some Aboriginal nations, members would probably include past and future as well as present
generations. See Little Bear, supra note 31 at 245.
In the Delgamuukv case, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en who brought the action appear to have
conceived of their claim in a way that included proprietary rights (ownership) and governmental
authority (urisdiction). See 'The Address of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs to
Chief Justice McEachem of the Supreme Court of British Columbia" [1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 17. By the
time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the claim had been recharacterized and argued
primarily as a claim to Aboriginal title, see Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 7, Lamer CJ.C. In its
decision, the Court declined to deal with the jurisdiction or self-government claim directly, leaving
that to be dealt with at a new trial (ibid at para. 170 (Lamer C.J.), para. 205 (La Forest J.)).
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acquisition of territorial sovereignty and acquisition of land. Both cases reveal that
Aboriginal title is not a mere private property right. It is communal and has a govern-
mental dimension that cannot be acquired by private persons. So the incapacity of the
settlers stems not so much from the doctrine of tenures and the fiction that the real
property rights of British subjects must originate from Crown grant, as from the fact
that settlers are private individuals who owe allegiance to the Crown and so cannot
acquire a title that is public in the sense that it is communal and entails governmental
authority. Given these attributes of Aboriginal title, it is not surprising that it can only
be transferred to an entity that has governmental capacity itself, like the Crown.
B. Constitutional History and Political Theory
Additional support for an explanation of the inalienability of Aboriginal title
based on the communal and political attributes of the title itself can be found in Eng-
lish constitutional history. The concept of the Crown as a legal entity apart from the
natural person of the king began to develop in the medieval period, and found judicial
expression in the sixteenth century.' Around the same time, a notion took root that the
king was not a personal ruler, but held an office that included certain responsibilities.
Among these was an obligation not to alienate elements of the Crown's property and
sovereignty, which included lands (the royal demesne), territory, and jurisdiction.'
The main reasons given for this were that the king's property and powers were ad-
ministered by him on behalf of his subjects as a whole, ' and that he should maintain
the realm and its appurtenances intact for his successor."0 Where alienations of terri-
tory were concerned, the shifting of homage and allegiance of the king's subjects to a
new ruler without their consent also involved a breach of feudal obligations.7' In Eng-
67 See Willion v. Berkley (1559), 1 Plow. 223, 75 E.R. 339 (C.P.); Case of the Duchy of Lancaster
(1561), 1 Plow. 212,75 E.R. 325 (Q.B). See also discussion in Kantorowicz, supra note 64, esp. at 7-
23.
"' See P.N. Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1956), discussing the development and application of this theory in conti-
nental Europe as well as in England. Riesenberg states: "[Tihe inalienable aspects of the Crown in-
cluded not only landed property and feudal rights over the royal demesne, but also a freedom of ac-
tion and prerogative which pertained to the ruler as king and which were qualitatively different from
those of a feudal lord" (ibid. at 99). He explains that the theory of inalienability was designed to pre-
serve "the regalian and feudal rights which ... formed a necessary foundation to the state" as well as
"the less tangible but ultimately more powerful assets of the monarchy: its very regality, dignity, free-
dom and scope of action" (ibid. at 15). See also Kantorowicz, ibid., esp. at 347-58.
6 Note the similarity to the explanation Martin C.J. gave in Symonds, supra note 3, for the rule that
settlers could not acquire lands for themselves in British colonies. See text accompanying notes 44-
46.
" Riesenberg, supra note 68, esp. at 20, 109.
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land, this restriction on the authority of the king to alienate the Crown's property and
powers was incorporated into the coronation oath, at least as sworn by Edward I in
1308, if not before.'
This theory of the inalienability of sovereignty was never rigidly applied, how-
ever." Insofar as lands were concerned, the English kings continued to alienate the
Crown's demesne by grant, as this was a means of obtaining necessary feudal services
and revenues.' We nonetheless have to pay close attention to the way in which Crown
lands were (and still are) alienated. As every first-year law student learns, the statute
Quia Emptores,75 enacted in 1290, prohibited the creation by subinfeudation of new
feudal lordships. Henceforth, alienation of a fee simple by one private landholder to
another had to take place by substitution. ' This statute, however, has never applied to
7' /bid at 129-44. On the meaning and importance of allegiance and its relation to the feudal con-
cept of fealty, see Blackstone, supra note 16, vol. 1 at 366-71. Regarding the impact on allegiance of
the 1783 Treaty of Versailles, whereby the British Crown recognized the independence of the United
States, see Doe d Thomas v. Acklam (1824), 2 B. & C. 779, 107 E.R. 572 (K.B.) [hereinafter Acklam
cited to B. & C.]; Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 7 L. Ed. 617
(1830); H. Broom, Constitutional Law ieived in Relation to Common Law, 2d ed., ed. by G.L. Den-
man (London: NV. Maxwell & Son, 1885) at 34-36,52-53.
' See B. Wilkinson, "The Coronation Oath of Edward II and the Statute of York" (1944) 19
Speculum 445; H.G. Richardson, 'The English Coronation Oath" (1949) 24 Speculum 44; E.H.
Kantorowicz, "Inalienability: A Note on Canonical Practice and the English Coronation Oath in the
Thirteenth Century" (1954) 29 Speculum 488.
" Riesenberg, supra note 68, makes this point repeatedly. In his conclusion (ibid. at 178), he writes
that basic to the theory's
fundamental importance as an element of public law, were its flexibility and its har-
mony with contemporary ideas. Since the theory of inalienability of sovereignty devel-
oped against the background of an essentially feudal society, it had to come to terms
with that surrounding reality. This it did by moderating the tone with which it pro-
claimed its prohibitions. Not all alienations or delegations of ruling authority were for-
bidden to the rulers of a state split into local units; only those which would substan-
tially block the progress of the new social and political order. By accommodating their
theory to the status quo, the legists and theorists were able to give it real force.
7' See generally R.S. Hoyt, The Royal Demesne in English Constitutional History: 1066-1272 (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1968). Some statutory restraints on alienation of Crown lands were enacted
in the eighteenth century, see Chitty, supra note 45 at 203-05. But according to Blackstone, supra
note 16, vol. 1 at 287, this was done "too late, after almost every valuable possession of the crown had
been granted away for ever, or else upon very long leases:' Chitty nonetheless states that, 'Even at
common law, the leaning and endeavour seems always to have been to preserve entire and to keep in
the possession of the Crown its demesne lands and possessions, as materially conducive to its dignity
and honour" (ibid at 205).
18 Edw. I, cc. 1-3.
76That is, the alienee replaces the alienor as tenant in fee of the feudal lord. See J. Williams, Princi-
pies of the Law of Real Property, 17th ed., ed. by T.C. Williams (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1892) at
45-46; C. Sweet, Challis's Law ofReal Property, 3d ed. (London: Butterworth, 1911) at 18-20.
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the Crown." So when the Crown grants land in fee simple-and this is as true today
as it was in 1290-the grantee holds the land in tenure from the Crown. In other
words, the alienation takes place as an infeudation rather than as a substitution. Thus,
"[i]f the king grants land to J.S. in fee, to hold as freely as the king is in his crown, yet
he shall hold of the king."'" The significance of this is that it reveals that the Crown is
incapable of giving up the feudal aspect of its sovereignty (otherwise known as its
paramount lordship)." So the theory of the inalienability of sovereignty applies in
England to prevent the Crown from creating real property interests that are inconsis-
tent with its sovereign rights over all the lands in the realm.'
Where alienation of territory is concerned, one has to consider international law
as well as the common law. Cession of territory from one sovereign to another has
long been accepted by European jurists in their expositions of the law of nations.
Early jurists, however, thought there were restrictions on the authority of rulers to al-
ienate territory and jurisdiction." Alberico Gentili, for example, in his 1598 work De
' See E.H. Bum, Cheshire and Bum's Modem Law of Real Property, 15th ed. (London: Butter-
worths, 1994) at 15; R. Megarry & W. Wade, The Law of Real Property, 6th ed., ed. by C. Harpum
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 29.
'" C. Viner, A General Abridgement of Law and Equity, 2d ed. (London: Robinson, Brook, Butter-
worth & White, 1791-94), "Tenure", B.a.15. See YB. 14 Hen. VI, 1.43, fol. lib at 12b. See also J.
Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England, 5th ed., ed. by A. Hammond (London: A. Straham, 1822),
"Tenure", A: "[I]hough the king releases to his tenant all services, yet he holds of him" Comyns re-
lied, first, on YB. 8 Hen. VII, fol. 12b, where it was said that "it is an incident to the king that all
lands are held of him, and there cannot be any lands that are not held of him, mediately or immedi-
ately" [translated by author]; and second, on Lowe's Case (1603), 9 Co. Rep. 122b, 77 E.R. 909 (Ct.
of Wards) at 123a, where it was held that the king cannot by grant extinguish the tenure because that
would be an alteration of the law.
" As Maitland wrote in reference to the medieval period, "All land in England must be held of the
king of England, otherwise he would not be king of all England": F Pollock & FW. Maitland, The
History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2d ed., reissued, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968) at 3. See also McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal 7itle, supra note 6 at 82-83,
n. 19.
"' Also, the Crown cannot make grants that infringe public rights to navigate and fish in tidal waters.
It appears that the former cannot be derogated from by Crown grant due to the common law, whereas
the latter have been protected since 1215 by Magna Carta. See Malcomson v. O'Dea (1863), 10
H.L.C. 593, 11 E.R. 1155; Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable (1865), 11 H.L.C. 192, 11 E.R. 1305
[hereinafter Gann]; British Columbia (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [19141 A.C. 153 (P.C.); Harper v.
Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989), 168 C.L.R. 314 (H.C. Ausfi.); Yarmirr, supra note 2 at 471-77
(Beaumont and von Doussa JJ.), 539-60 (Merkel J., dissenting in part); Halsbury's Laws of England,
4th ed., vol. 8 (London: Butterworths, 1974) at para. 1419. In Gann, Lord Westbury said that the
Crown's ownership of the bed of tidal waters "is for the benefit of the subject,' thus acknowledging
the public nature of the Crown's sovereign rights in that context (ibiL at 207).
" For a very useful discussion, see T. Meron, "The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle
Ages" (1995) 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 1.
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iure belli libri tres, wrote that rulers may not make their subjects change rulers with-
out their consent, as rulers and subjects "are bound by mutual obligations "' Similarly,
Hugo Grotius expressed the view in his 1625 classic De jure belli ac pacis libri tres
that, although a king can alienate the sovereignty he holds by inheritance, he cannot
alienate part of a people without their consent because to do so would violate the
original "voluntary compact".' Nonetheless, Grotius saw "nothing to hinder a people,
or even a king with the consent of the people, from alienating sovereignty over a
place, that is, a part of its territory, for example, a part that is uninhabited or de-
serted" Vattel, in his influential work Le droit des gens,' first published in 1758,
took a more categorical position:
Every true sovereignty is essentially inalienable. We shall easily be convinced
of this if we consider the origin and aim of political society and of the sover-
eign authority. A Nation constitutes itself a social body to work for the com-
mon good as it shall think fit, and to live according to its own laws. With this
object in view it establishes a public authority. If it confides this authority to a
prince, even with the power to transfer his authority to other hands, that can
never imply, unless the express and unanimous consent of the citizens be given,
the right to really alienate it, or to subject the State to another political body; for
the individuals who formed that society entered into it for the purpose of living
A. Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, trans. J.C. Rolfe, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) c. 15
at para. 608. To the argument that the people may have granted the ruler "full dominion and power
over themselves", he responded forcefully: 'It is true that the people conferred all sovereignty and
power, but they did so in order that they might be governed like men, not sold like cattle" (ibid. at
para. 609).
"' H. Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, trans. EW. Kelsey (New York: Bobbs-Menill, 1925) at
bk. 2, c. 6, pts. 3-4. Grotius distinguished between territories where the king's rights were proprietary
or patrimonial, and territories where his rights were usufructuary because the kingship was conferred
by succession or election (ibid. at bk. 1, c. 3, pt. 12, and bk. 1, c. 4, pt. 10). This distinction is even
more prominent in C. Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749), trans. J.H. Drake
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934) at §1007, where the author states that the people's consent is re-
quired only in the latter case. See also infra note 97.
Grotius, ibid at bk. 2, c. 6, pt. 7. On the necessity for the people's consent, he said that "both the
whole territory and its parts are the undivided common property of the people, and therefore subject
to the will of the people" (ibid.).
E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou les principes de la loi naturelle, appliqus a la conduite et aux
affaires des nations et des souverains, reproduction and trans. of 1758 edition, trans. C.G. Fenwick
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1916). In Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 51 at 561, Mar-
shall CJ. used Vattel to support his position that the Indian nations did not surrender their right of
self-government when they signed treaties of association and protection with Britain and the United
States. Vattel was also mentioned in the judgments of Chapman J. and Martin CJ. in Symonds, supra
note 3 at 392, 395. Martin C.J. quoted a passage from Attorney-General v. Brown (1847), 1 Legge
312 at 318 (N.S.W. S.C.), where Stephen CJ. relied on Vattel as authority that the sovereign, as "the
representative and the executive authority of the nation," is the "moral personality" that holds public
lands as the "patrimony of the nation".
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in an independent State and by no means with the intention of submitting to a
foreign yoke.86
A common theme in the writings of each of these jurists is a requirement of consent
by the people affected by the transfer of territory, stemming from the social contract
between rulers and their subjects."'
More recent international law experts, however, have been less willing to question
the authority of sovereigns to alienate territory." Oppenheim, for example, wrote in
1905:
Cession of State territory is the transfer of sovereignty over State territory by
the owner State to another State. There is no doubt whatever that such cession
is possible according to the Law of Nations, and history presents innumerable
examples of such transfer of sovereignty. The Constitutional Law of the differ-
ent States may or may not lay down special rules for the transfer or acquisition
of territory. Such rules can have no direct influence upon the rules of the Law
of Nations concerning cession, since Municipal Law can neither abolish exist-
ing nor create new rules of International Law. But if such municipal rules con-
tain constitutional restrictions of the Government with regard to cession of ter-
ritory, these restrictions are so far important that such treaties of cession con-
Vattel, ibid. at bk. 1, c. 5, §69; see also bk. 1, c. 21, §260. At bk. 1, c. 5, §69, Vattel answered the
contrary argument from state practice in this way: "I know that several authors, Grotius among them,
give us many instances of alienations of sovereignty. But the examples frequently prove only the
abuse of power and not the right; and besides, the people consented to the alienation, either willingly
or by force" [footnote omitted].
8 The concept of a social contract as the basis of civil society was, of course, developed more fully
in England by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. See T. Hobbes, Leviathan (originally published in
1651), ed. by R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); J. Locke, Second Treatise of
Government (originally published in 1690) in Two Treatises of Government, ed. by P. Laslett
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) esp. at §§44-74. For further discussion, see J.W.
Gough, The Social Contract, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). For Locke, however, the
contract was between all members of a society, rather than between ruler and subjects, though
eighteenth-century English Whigs and American revolutionaries relied on Locke to support the latter
sort of social contract theory (which is what the international jurists seem to have had in mind as
well). See J.G. Marston, King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) at 16-20. See also Blackstone, supra note 16, vol. 1 at
233, referring to the "reciprocal duties" of "protection and subjection" arising from "the original
contract between king and people" [emphasis in original].
'8 This may be due in part to a shift from the natural law approach of earlier jurists to a more posi-
tivist, state-practice orientation. See generally S.A. Williams & A.L.C. de Mestral, An Introduction to
International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1987) at 5. R. Phillimore, for example, relied mainly on state practice to reject the contention of
Grotius that usufructuary kingdoms, and of Vattel that public property or domain, cannot be alienated
without the consent of the people. R. Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, vol. 1
(Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 1854) at 222-30.
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cluded by heads of State or Governments as violate these restrictions are not
binding.9
He acknowledged, however, the view of some writers that the inhabitants of a territory
should not be forced to change their citizenship without their consent, expressed in a
plebiscite? This view is also supported by the modem principle of self-
determination.' Still, Professor Brownlie states that "at present there is insufficient
practice to warrant the view that a transfer is invalid simply because there is no suffi-
cient provision for expression of opinion by the inhabitants." But even if this is cor-
rect internationally, there may still be a domestic law requirement of popular assent
that may have an impact on the validity of a cession of territory-as Oppenheim
noted?
We therefore need to ask whether the Crown, in English constitutional law, has
the authority to transfer territorial sovereignty to another ruler. Historically, it seems
very doubtful that the king could do this without the assent of the people, expressed
through Parliament. We have already seen that at his coronation Edward H swore to
maintain the rights of the Crown.' After 1308 this undertaking was dropped from the
coronation oath, perhaps because the principle it expressed had become too en-
" L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, 1905) at §213
[footnotes omitted]. This passage was substantially unchanged in volume 1 of the 8th edition, ed. by
H. Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green, 1955) at §213. See also R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of
Territory in International Law (Manchester Manchester University Press, 1963) at 16-19.
Oppenheim, ibid at §219. See also authorities cited in the 8th edition, ibid. at §219, n. 5. Oppen-
heim, however, suggested that this problem could be dealt with by a stipulation in the treaty of cession
that the inhabitants have the option of retaining their old citizenship or emigrating, Oppenheim, ibid.
at §219. See also Ti. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 4th ed. by PH. Winfield (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1911) at 95ff. Compare W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., ed. by
A.P. Higgins (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924) at 54: 'The principle that the wishes of a population
are to be consulted when the territory which they inhabit is ceded has not been adopted into interna-
tional law, and cannot be adopted into it until title by conquest has disappeared."
9' See C.C. Hyde, International Lmv Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1922) at §§108-09. On the use of plebiscites to determine the will of the peo-
ple of a territory in this regard, see M.M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 2 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1963) at 1168-72.
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at
167.
93 However, Jennings, supra note 89 at 17-18, suggests that the validity of a treaty of cession in the
constitutional law of the ceding state is not relevant to its validity in international law, at least "where
there has been actual tradition [handing over] of the territory." He relied on Union of India v. Manmull
Jain (1954), 41 A.I.R. Calcutta 615 (H.C.). In that case, however, the argument that was unsuccess-
fully made was that a cession of territory from France to India was invalid because it had not been as-
sented to by the Parliament of India.
' See above note 72 and accompanying text.
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trenched to be seriously questioned." In any case, Sir Matthew Hale, in The Preroga-
tives of the King, which was probably written during the period of the Interregnum in
the 1650s,' said of the king that "Neither could nor can he part with that right [thejus
summi imperii] in all or any part of his dominions, but by consent of the people [and]
states of the kingdom in parliament, for the relation and bond is reciprocal." Hale
gave several examples from English constitutional history to demonstrate the applica-
tion of this principle, among which was a declaration by Parliament in 1366 that King
John's cession of England and Ireland in 1213 to Pope Innocent 111 as feudal lord was
null and void because "neither the said King John nor any other could bring himself
or his realm or his people into such subjection without their assent'" ' Nonetheless, in
practice the Crown has in the past relinquished its sovereignty over some of its colo-
nial possessions without the direct concurrence of Parliament, as when it recognized
the independence of the United States by the Treaty of Versailles in 1783." Perhaps
' See Riesenberg, supra note 68 at 126. Referring to the king, barons, and commons at that time,
Riesenberg writes, "All were alive to the fact that England was a kingdom whose destiny was, so to
speak, immortal and independent of that of the king" (ibid. at 126-27).
9 See D.E.C. Yale, ed., Sir Matthew Hale's The Prerogatives of the King (London: Selden Society,
1976) at ix, n. 1 [hereinafter Hale's Prerogatives]. Hale is generally recognized as one of England's
great legists and judges. Baker wrote that Hale was "[f]ar superior to Coke" and was regarded as "an
oracle in his own time", J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2d ed. (London: But-
terworths, 1979) at 165. Potter praised him by saying, "Besides being a learned lawyer and an histo-
rian, he possessed great grace of character, and it is his honesty of soul and purpose in a partisan age
which gives to his work some of its peculiar value" A.K.R. Kiralfy, Potter's Historical Introduction to
English Law and Its Institutions, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1958) at 289 [footnote omitted].
97 Hale's Prerogatives, ibid. at 15. In this passage, Hale was repeating the view of medieval theorists
that reciprocal feudal obligations prevented kings from unilaterally transferring their subjects' alle-
giance to other kings. See above note 71 and accompanying text. Hale also rejected the argument that
England was the property of the king and thus transferable by him: "Though it be regnum hereditar-
ium, yet it is not regnumpatrimoniale, so as to be transferred by the absolute power of the king to any
other without the consent of the kingdom and that in a regular and parliamentary way" (ibid. at 16).
On the distinction between usufructuary and patrimonial kingships, which Hale obviously had in
mind, see generally supra note 83.
" Ibid. at 17. The quotation is from the declaration itself, Rotuli Parliamentorum, 40 Edw. Ill, vol. 2
at 290, no. 7, as translated in C.H. Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West From the
Greeks to the End of the Middle Ages (New York: Macmillan, 1932) at 380 [footnote omitted]. See
also Meron, supra note 81 at 6. Hale also observed, Hale's Prerogatives, ibid. at 18, that Henry VIII
had been unable to change the succession to the throne by letters patent or will without an enabling
act of Parliament. See 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7; 35 Hen. VIII, c. 1.
99 See Roberts-Wray, supra note 48 at 118: "Negotiation was authorized by Act of Parliament [22
Geo. Ill, c. 46; see also 18 Geo. II, c. 13] but not the surrender of sovereignty." See also W.R. Anson,
The Law and Custom of the Constitution, 4th ed., ed. by A.B. Keith, vol. 2, part 2 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1935) at 138; S.A. de Smith & R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8th ed.
(London: Penguin Books, 1998) at 148. Compare Acklam, supra note 71 at 795-96, where Abbott
C.J. said: "[I]f the sanction of the British Legislature could be thought necessary to give validity to
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the explanation for this is that, in colonial contexts, the consent of the local inhabitants
rather than the consent of Parliament is what matters.'" According to Stanley de Smith
and Rodney Brazier, however, "in modem practice the transfer of British territory and
the implementation of a peace treaty are always effected by statute.""' Moreover, they
said, "It is very doubtful whether the Crown has a prerogative to cede any part of the
United Kingdom"" So even in modem British constitutional law, the authority of the
Crown to cede territory without the assent of either the local inhabitants or Parliament
appears somewhat doubtful."3
To sum up, the concept of the inalienability of sovereignty has deep roots in the
political philosophy of medieval Europe. General acceptance of this concept accom-
panied the emergence of the principle that the rights and powers of kings are held on
behalf of the people and so should be exercised for their benefit. In England, the same
concept and underlying principle lay behind Edward I's coronation promise to
maintain the rights of the Crown. The concept of inalienability was accepted by Hale
in his mid-seventeenth-century exposition of the prerogatives of the king. It also
found its way into the law of nations, where it was strongly endorsed as late as 1758
this treaty [the Treaty of Versailles], such sanction has been abundantly given." For other examples of
cessions without the express concurrence of Parliament, see Roberts-Wray (ibid. at 119-26), Anson
(ibid at 138-40). Apparently the only other case on point is Damodhar Gordhan v. Deoram Kanji
(1876), 1 App. Cas. 332 at 373-74 (P.C.), where Lord Selbome said that their Lordships entertain
"grave doubts (to say no more) of the soundness" of the opinion of the High Court at Bombay that the
Crown could not make a cession of territory without the concurrence of Parliament (the Privy Council
did not have to decide this issue because, unlike the High Court, it found that a cession had not taken
place). See discussion in Roberts-Wray (ibid. at 120-22); D.L. Keir & F.H. Lawson, Cases in Consti-
tutional Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) at 108-09.
"" This explanation may, however, be more satisfying to political theorists than to constitutional
lawyers. There is nonetheless some support for it in constitutional law. See C.H. Mcllwain, The
American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Macmillan, 1928; reprint Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1958), arguing that men like James Wilson and John Adams were probably
correct when they asserted that the British Parliament did not have jurisdiction over the American
Colonies.
"', De Smith & Brazier, supra note 99. See also O.H. Phillips & P. Jackson, 0. Hood Phillips' Con-
stitutional and Administrative Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) at 287.02 De Smith & Brazier, ibid On the same page, they described as "a flight of fancy" Walter Bage-
hot's suggestion in The English Constitution (London: C.A. Watts, 1964) at 287, that the Crown has a
prerogative right to cede Cornwall. See also Phillips & Jackson, ibid, where it is suggested that the
royal prerogative respecting cessions of territory does not apply in the United Kingdom.
"' See Anson, supra note 99 at 137-42; E.C.S. Wade & A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Adminis-
trative Lmv, 11th ed. by A.W. Bradley & K.D. Ewing (London: Longman, 1993) at 265-66. Compare
W.S. Holdsworth, "The Treaty-Making Power of the Crown" (1942) 58 L.Q. Rev. 175 esp. at 182-83;
E.W. Ridges, Constitutional Law, 8th ed., ed. by G.A. Forrest (London: Stevens and Sons, 1950) at
225; S.IC Agrawala, International Law: Indian Courts and Legislature (New York: Oceana, 1965) at
23-24.
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by Vattel.'" By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the concept seems to have
been losing force both internationally and domestically in Britain, perhaps as a result
of the growth of national states and of the influence of legal positivism. It began to re-
emerge internationally in the twentieth century as a corollary to the right of self-
determination.
The existence of this concept of inalienability when North America was being
colonized by European nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries assists us
in understanding the inalienability of Aboriginal title. If the Aboriginal peoples were
sovereign nations at the time, the stipulation in the Royal Proclamation that their
lands could be purchased only in the name of the Crown "at some public Meeting or
Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose ,""' is consistent with the
principle that sovereigns could not alienate parts of their territory without the consent
of the people. The Crown's exclusive right to purchase those lands is also consistent
with the principle of British constitutional law that, unlike private property, territory
can be acquired only by the Crown, not by private persons."' This principle is linked,
in turn, to the doctrine of tenures, which prevents the Crown from alienating its para-
mount lordship because that is a feature of its sovereignty. So just as they are incapa-
ble of acquiring the Crown's lordship, private persons cannot acquire Indian lands be-
cause the Aboriginal title to those lands has attributes of sovereignty that can only be
acquired by another sovereign, such as the Crown. This explains why the Crown has
to acquire those lands first by accepting a surrender of Aboriginal title before the
lands can be converted into private property.
This explanation for the inalienability of Aboriginal title is implicitly supported
by Johnson v. M'Intosh"' and Worcester v. Georgia,"' the two leading decisions of the
United States Supreme Court on the inalienability of Indian title and the sovereignty
of the Indian nations. In those cases, Chief Justice Marshall decided that the exclusive
right of the British Crown, and hence of the United States, to acquire Indian title was
based on what he called the "doctrine of discovery". We therefore need to analyze
those decisions to understand how the doctrine of discovery is related to Indian sover-
eignty and the concept of inalienability.
" See text accompanying note 86. As we have seen, this was around the same time the British
Crown was implementing its policy of forbidding private purchases of Indian lands in North America,
which found general expression in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. See above notes 8-9 and accom-
panying text.
"o Supra note 9 at 6.
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C. Chief Justice Marshall and the Doctrine of Discovery
Johnson v. M'Intosh involved lands north of the Ohio River that had been sold to
private purchasers in 1773 and 1775 by chiefs of the Illinois and Piankeshaw Nations.
As the stated facts established the right of those nations to the lands and the authority
of the chiefs to deal with them, the sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether
private purchasers could acquire a valid title from Indian nations. Marshall C.J., for
the court, gave three reasons for holding they could not. Taking them in reverse order,
his third reason was that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 applied in the region at the
time, making these purchases unlawful. His second reason, which we will return to
later, was that the purchased lands would still be part of the territory of the Illinois and
Piankeshaw Nations, and so would be subject to their laws. If they chose to resume
those lands and include them in treaties of cession to the United States (as in fact hap-
pened), the purchasers could have no recourse to the courts of the United States. But
these two reasons appear to have been secondary, as Marshall C.J. devoted most of his
judgment to his first reason.
This reason was that, after the "discovery" of North America, to avoid conflict
among themselves, the colonizing European nations adopted the principle "that dis-
covery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession."' He continued:
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave the nation making the
discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing
settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere.""
If one accepts Marshall C.J.'s premise that discovery gave what has sometimes been
called an inchoate title to the discovering sovereign,"' his conclusion that other Euro-
IC9 Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4 at 573. In actual fact, however, the existence of such a princi-
ple is extremely doubtful, as there does not seem to have been much agreement among the European
nations at the time over what was necessary to acquire territorial sovereignty. See J.T. Juricek, 'Eng-
lish Territorial Claims in North America Under Elizabeth and the Early Stuarts" (1976) 7 Terrae In-
cognitae 7; B. Slattery, "Did France Claim Canada Upon 'Discovery'?" in J.M. Bumsted, ed., Inter-
preting Canada's Past, vol. 1, Before Confederation (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986) 2. See
also L.G. Robertson, "John Marshall as Colonial Historian: Reconsidering the Origins of the Discov-
ery Doctrine" (1997) 13 J. L. & Pol. 759, revealing the historical weaknesses in this aspect of Mar-
shall's judgment.
Johnson v. M'ntosh, ibid. at 573.
.. This aspect of his decision has attracted a lot of criticism. See e.g. G.I. Bennett, "Aboriginal Title
in the Common Law: A Stony Path Through Feudal Doctrine" (1978) 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 617 esp. at
646-49; V. Deloria, Jr., Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985) at 85-111; R.A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in West-
ern Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 312-
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pean sovereigns could not interfere by acquiring lands from the Indian nations within
the discovered territory makes sense, as otherwise a conflict between two European
sovereigns could arise. However, it is not evident why subjects of the discovering sov-
ereign would also be prevented from acquiring Indian lands. It appears from Marshall
C.J.'s judgment that the reason for this is that the Indian title, while "entitled to the re-
spect of all Courts until it should be legitimately extinguished," '2 is simply "a right of
occupancy" that cannot be sold or transferred, but can only be surrendered to the dis-
covering sovereign who holds the "absolute, ultimate title" to the soil."' In an oft-
quoted passage that seems to sum up his views on the status and rights of the Indian
nations after acquisition of a European title by discovery, he said:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well
as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made 
it."4
By recognizing that a European title based on discovery only diminished the rights of
the Indian nations to complete sovereignty, this passage acknowledged the pre-
existing sovereignty of the Indian nations, and prepared the ground for Marshall C.J.'s
later acceptance of its continuation."'
17; S.T. Newcomb, "The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of
Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power" (1993) 20 Rev. L. & Soc. Change 303; D.E.
Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1997) at 31-35.
"' Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4 at 592, citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 3 L. Ed.
162 (1810).
"' Ibid. at 588, 592. Marshall also stated: "[Tihe Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as
occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed
incapable of transferring the absolute title to others" (ibid. at 591). Compare Mitchel v. United States,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 at 756, 9 L. Ed. 283 (1835), Baldwin J. for the court, a case involving acquisition
of Indian lands in Florida by private persons with the authorization of the Spanish governor, where the
Indian title under the Spanish and the British was described as a "right of property". Note also that the
Indian nations have the full beneficial use and possession of their lands, including surface and subsur-
face resources, in much the same way as Lamer C.J.C. held that the Aboriginal nations in Canada
have the exclusive use and possession of their lands. See Paine Lumber, supra note 4; United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 58 S. Ct. 794 (1938) esp. at 116-17; United States v. Klamath and
Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 58 S. Ct. 799 (1938) at 122-23.
"' Johnson v. M'Intosh, ibid. at 574. This passage was quoted and emphasized by Lamer C.J.C. in
R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at par. 36, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 200 N.R. 1 [hereinafter Van
der Peet].
"' See P.P. Frickey, "Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpreta-
tion in Federal Indian Law" (1993) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381 at 390.
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In Worcester v. Georgia,"6 Chief Justice Marshall cast further light on the issue of
inalienability of Indian title. He began his analysis by affirming the pre-existing sov-
ereignty of the Indian nations and by questioning his own conclusion in Johnson v.
M'Intosh that discovery gave title to the discovering European nation:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and the rest of
the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their
own laws. It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of
either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over
the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the discov-
ery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the country dis-
" 7covered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors. '
But taking a pragmatic approach, Marshall C.J. said nonetheless that "power, war,
conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world?'"'
He then explained what he had meant in Johnson v. M'Intosh when he outlined
the principle of discovery:
This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the interest of
all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable
consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on
it. It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among
those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of
those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among
the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in
possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a dis-
covery made before the memory of man. It gave an exclusive right to purchase,
but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.'9
Here we have a clear statement of how discovery gave the discovering nation an ex-
clusive right vis-ai-vis other European nations to acquire territory from the Indian na-
tions, without diminishing their sovereignty or right to their lands.'" Marshall C.J. put
1,6 Supra note 51. See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831),
where Marshall CJ. initiated the exposition of the doctrine of Indian sovereignty that he developed
more fully in Worcester v. Georgia. For commentary, see J.C. Burke, "The Cherokee Cases: A Study
in Law, Politics, and Morality" (1969) 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500; J. Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The
Confrontation of Law and Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996).
". Worcester v. Georgia, ibid. at 542-43. This passage was quoted with apparent approval by Lamer
Ci.C. in Van der Peet, supra note 114 at para. 37.
... Worcester v. Georgia, ibid at 543 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 544 [emphasis added].
Though Marshall CJ. did not say so, in Worcester v. Georgia, he evidently modified the principle
of discovery he had articulated in Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4. For further discussion, see K.
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this even more forcefully in a subsequent passage, in reference to royal charters
granted by the British Crown:
The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the sea
coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate
power by them [the charters] to govern the people, or occupy the lands from
sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man. They were well understood to
convey the title which, according to the common law of European sovereigns
respecting America, they might rightfully convey, and no more. This was the
exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell."'
He later confirmed this by stating that "these grants asserted a title against Europeans
only, and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were con-
cerned'"
Throughout his judgment, Marshall C.J. affirmed that the Indian nations retained
jurisdiction over and title to their territories even after they entered into treaties
bringing them under the protection of the British Crown and later the United States.'2
In one such passage, he said:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent politi-
cal communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed pos-
sessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that im-
posed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
McNeil, "Sovereignty on the Northern Plains: Indian, European, American and Canadian Claims"
(2000) 39:3 Journal of the West 10.
21 Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 51 at 544-45 [emphasis added].
22 Ibid. at 546. For a British colonial law perspective on the efficacy of royal charters, see Staples v.
R. (1899, unreported), where the Privy Council decided that the British South Africa Company Char-
ter could not, of itself, give the Crown territorial sovereignty over Matabeleland (Southern Rhodesia).
In the course of the proceedings, the Lord Chancellor commented that the charter could not "give ju-
risdiction of sovereignty over a place Her Majesty has no authority in" This is quoted and discussed
in K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Nations and Quebec's Boundaries: Canada Couldn't Give What It Didn't
Have" in K. McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Sas-
katoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 1 at 11-12. The proceedings in Staples
are printed in S.A. Scott, The Prerogative of the Crown in External Affairs and Constituent Authority
in a Constitutional Monarchy (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1968), App. I [unpublished]. For
discussion of this issue in the context of the Hudson's Bay Company Charter, see K. McNeil, "Sover-
eignty and the Aboriginal Nations of Rupert's Land" (1999) 37 Manitoba History 2.
' He said that the treaties, which extended to the Indian nations "the protection of Great Britain,
and afterwards that of the United States:' did not take away their right of self-government, as "a
weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with
a stronger, and taking its protection." Worcester v. Georgia, ibid. at 560-61, relying on Vattel, supra
note 85.
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other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed ...2
Citing the Royal Proclamation of 1763, including its prohibition against private pur-
chases of Indian lands, he observed:
Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations inhabiting the
territory from which she excluded all other Europeans ... she considered them
as nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing
themselves, under her protection; and she made treaties with them, the obliga-
tion of which she acknowledged."
Likewise the United States, in statutes (as well as in treaties), "manifestly consider[ed]
the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial bounda-
ries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands
within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the
United States."2 Given the Indian nations' status as "distinct, independent political
communities" with territorial rights that included both governmental authority and ti-
tle to land, British subjects and American citizens clearly would not have the capacity
to acquire those rights from them. Only another sovereign could do that, and Marshall
C.J.'s principle of discovery led him to conclude that, in the part of North America
under consideration, the sovereign in question was first the British Crown, and then its
successor, the United States. When read together, Johnson v. M'Intosh and Worcester
v. Georgia therefore show that the inalienability of Aboriginal title arises first from
the exclusive right of the Crown as the colonizing sovereign to acquire it, and second
from the inability of private persons to receive a title that is cloaked with attributes of
sovereignty.
This explanation of inalienability also provides a solution to another unresolved
issue, namely whether Aboriginal title can be transferred from one Aboriginal nation
to another after Crown acquisition of sovereignty. As the Aboriginal nations were not
parties to the alleged agreement among European powers (that discovery gave the ex-
clusive right of acquiring Aboriginal title to the discovering sovereign), they would
not be bound by it.'" Moreover, as they would all have sovereign status as distinct, in-
24 Ilbrcester v. Georgia, ibid. at 559 [emphasis added]. This passage was quoted and emphasized
by Lamer CJ.C. in Van der Peet, supra note 114 at para. 37. See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
supra note 116 at 16-17, Marshall C.L
12 Ilbrcester v. Georgia, ibiL at 548. This passage was quoted with approval by Lamer J. (as he
then was) in R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R 1025 at 1054, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 427, 109 N.R. 22 [hereinafter
Sioui cited to S.C.R.].
126 Worcester v. Georgia, ibid. at 557.
127 See ibid. at 544, quoted in text accompanying note 119 above. This rule of privity, expressed by
the Latin maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, is also part of the modem law of treaties. See
Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 309-10; C. Chinkin, Third
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dependent political communities, they would not be handicapped by the incapacity
suffered by private persons. As the inalienability aspect of Aboriginal title appears to
be a result of inter-European diplomacy and settler incapacity, rather than an inherent
feature of the title itself, absent restrictions in the law of the Aboriginal nations in
question," it should be transferable among them.' This is supported by La Forest J.'s
judgment in Delgamuukw, where he said that continuity of occupation by an Aborigi-
nal group need not date from the time of Crown sovereignty, as "one aboriginal group
may have ceded its possession to subsequent occupants or merged its territory with
that of another aboriginal society. As well, the occupancy of one aboriginal society
may be connected to the occupancy of another society by conquest or exchange."'"
The inalienability of Aboriginal title could nonetheless be a serious impediment
to economic development of Aboriginal title lands, as it prevents them from being
sold to non-Aboriginal third parties without the intervention of the Crown. This could
mean, for example, that an Aboriginal nation that wanted to receive the benefit of
minerals under its lands by leasing them to a mining company would first have to sur-
render them to the Crown for that purpose.'3 ' Another way of approaching this is more
respectful of the decision-making authority of Aboriginal peoples regarding their
lands,'32 but is nonetheless in keeping with the inalienability of their title. Support for
this approach can be found in Chief Justice Marshall's second reason for denying the
validity of private purchases of Indian lands in Johnson v. M'Intosh.
D. Inalienability and Economic Development
We have seen that Marshall C.J.'s main reason for invalidating private purchases
of Indian lands in Johnson v. M'Intosh was that the doctrine of discovery gave the
Parties in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 26-27, 33; Brownlie, supra note 92
at 628; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 34 in I.
Brownie, ed., Basic Documents in International Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 233.
,
2 See Little Bear, supra note 31 at 247, where, in the context of treaty-making, the author states:
In summary, the standard or norm of the aboriginal peoples' law is that land is not
transferable and therefore is inalienable. Land and benefits therefrom may be shared
with others, and when Indian nations entered into treaties with European nations, the
subject of the treaty, from the Indians' viewpoint, was not the alienation of the land but
the sharing of the land.
See also McNeil, "Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title", supra note 33.
See B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 742-43.
'
3o Supra note 1 at para. 198.
'3' Though the Indian Act, supra note 19, does not apply to Aboriginal title lands that are not within
reserves, it is worth noting that under the statute a surrender is required for reserve lands to be leased
for such a purpose. See e.g. Blueberry River Indian Band, supra note 21 (dealing with surrender of
mineral rights under an earlier version of the Indian Act).
' See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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discovering nation the exclusive right, as against other European nations, to acquire
those lands. To a lesser extent, Marshall C.J. also relied on the Royal Proclamation of
1763. But he gave another reason which, though seldom commented on, has the po-
tential to augment Indigenous peoples' control over their lands through the exercise of
the inherent right of self-government that Marshall C.J. so strongly endorsed in his
later decision in Worcester v. Georgia.
After presenting his lengthy exposition of the doctrine of discovery and its effects,
the Chief Justice said that "[a]nother view has been taken of this question, which de-
serves to be considered""3 The Crown's title, he said, could only be acquired from the
Crown, and all that a private purchaser could acquire from the Indians was the Indian
title. However, "[t]he person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their ter-
ritory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds
their title under their protection, and subject to their laws."'" He then equated this
situation with a grant made by an Aboriginal nation to one of its members, "author-
izing him to hold a particular tract of land in severalty.' Marshall C.J. continued:
As such a grant could not separate the Indian from his nation, nor give a title
which our Courts could distinguish from the title of his tribe, as it might still be
conquered from, or ceded by his tribe, we can perceive no legal principle which
will authorize a Court to say, that different consequences are attached to this
purchase, because it was made by a stranger'6
This part of his judgment is significant partly because it acknowledges that Abo-
riginal law continued to apply within the Indian nations after European colonization.
Moreover, as Marshall C.J. also admitted the power of the Indian nations "to change
their laws or usages," l it supports the concept of Indian self-government that he de-
veloped in Worcester v. Georgia. As Professor Brian Slattery has pointed out, this ex-
planation for inalienability was not necessarily offered as an alternative to the doc-
trine of discovery. Instead, the two appear to complement one another. Slattery's
analysis is worth quoting at length:
The court in effect recognizes that the situation under consideration is governed
simultaneously by two distinct legal regimes, Anglo-American and Indian. The
first argument approaches the question from within the context of Anglo-
American law. ... [Tuhe second argument ... looks to the Indian side of the mat-
ter. It holds that the rules in force in settler communities do not directly apply to
Indian peoples living independent lives in their own territories under their own
laws. Just as an Indian nation may presumably confer exclusive land rights on
"'Jolnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4 at 592-93.
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particular members of the group (if the laws of the nation allow this), so also it
is conceivable that an Indian nation might grant land to individual outsiders. In
such a case, maintains the court, the outsider assimilates himself with the Indi-
ans, and holds his lands subject to their authority and under their laws. If the
Indians subsequently surrender their lands to the government so as to extin-
guish not only the collective title of the group itself, but also any particular
rights held by group members, then the rights of the outsider are nullified as
well, for he stands in no higher a position than any other member of the
138
group.
Marshall C.J.'s judgment provides us, in this context of inalienability, with a way
to follow Chief Justice Lamer's direction in Delgamuukw that both the common law
and Aboriginal perspectives have to be taken into account.' The result, as Slattery has
explained, is that two separate legal regimes have to be considered. The common law
of Aboriginal title operates at the level of intergovernmental relations between the In-
dian or Aboriginal nations and the American and Canadian governments. At that
level, Aboriginal title is inalienable other that by surrender to the United States or the
Crown, for the reasons we have discussed. But within Indian or Aboriginal nations,
those reasons should not apply because no alienation of Aboriginal title is involved. If
their own laws so permit, they could create interests in land within their own territo-
ries, while retaining their communal title to the whole of their territories. This would
be an important aspect of the decision-making authority that Lamer C.J. said Aborigi-
nal nations have with respect to their lands. "' And as Marshall C.J. pointed out, if the
laws of an Indian or Aboriginal nation can permit the creation of interests in favour of
members of the nation, as must be the case, there appears to be no valid reason why
they cannot also permit the creation of interests in favour of non-members. As the
non-members' interest would be held under the nation's Aboriginal title and subject to
' B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) at 29.
139 See Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at paras. 81-82, 112, 147.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that Indian bands do have lim-
ited authority of this kind with respect to their reserve lands under s. 20 of the Indian Act, supra note
19, which permits band councils to allot possession of reserve lands to Indians. However, exercise of
this authority is subject to approval by the Minister of Indian Affairs. Also, s. 58(3) of the act author-
izes the minister to lease reserve land that is in lawful possession of an Indian for his or her benefit. A
lease can be made under this subsection to a non-Indian without a surrender of the land, so that it re-
mains within the reserve and is therefore subject to the bylaw-making authority of the band council,
e.g. respecting zoning. See R. v. Devereux, [1965] S.C.R. 567, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 546; Boyer v. Canada
(1986), 2 FC. 393, 65 N.R. 305 (C.A.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused (1986),
72 N.R. 365n.; Tsartlip Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop-
ment), [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 258 (F.C.T.D.). See also s. 28(2), empowering the minister to "authorize any
person for a period not exceeding one year, or with the consent of the council of the band for any
longer period, to occupy or use a reserve or to reside or otherwise exercise rights on a reserve."
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their laws, the nation would retain control over the land.' As Marshall C.J. pointed
out, the land would still be part of their territory and so could be resumed by them
through the exercise of their continuing authority to change and apply their own
laws.42
Support for limiting the application of the inalienability rule to transfers of Abo-
riginal title, so that the capacity of Aboriginal nations to create interests in land under
that title is acknowledged, can also be found in Australia in the High Court decision in
Mabo.' In that case, which involved a Native title claim to islands in the Torres Strait
at the northern tip of Queensland, the court declared that "the Meriam people are en-
titled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the
lands of the Murray Islands."" Writing the principal judgment, Brennan J. (as he then
was) addressed the inalienability of Native title:
[Ulnless there are pre-existing laws of a territory over which the Crown ac-
quires sovereignty which provide for the alienation of interests in land to
strangers, the rights and interests which constitute a native title can be pos-
sessed only by the indigenous inhabitants and their descendants. Native title,
though recognized by the common law, is not an institution of the common law
and is not alienable by the common law. Its alienability is dependent on the
laws from which it is derived."5
Elaborating on this, he said:
It follows that a right or interest possessed as a native title cannot be acquired
from an indigenous people by one who, not being a member of the indigenous
people, does not acknowledge their laws and observe their customs; nor can
such a right or interest be acquired by a clan, group or member of the indige-
nous people unless the acquisition is consistent with the laws and customs of
that people. Such a right or interest can be acquired outside those laws and
customs only by the Crown.1'
From this, it is apparent that Brennan J. thought there are two kinds of alienation of
Native title land. The first involves creation of a right or interest that is still subject to
the laws and customs of the Indigenous people in question, and apparently depends
14' This control should alleviate any lingering concerns over the need to protect Indigenous nations
from exploitation. See Part I above.
112 Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4 at 593.
'
43Supra note 2.
'"Ibid. at 217 [italics removed]: see text accompanying notes 51-59. Note that the concept of Na-
tive title in Australia is more inclusive than the concept of Aboriginal title in Canada, as it can include
rights that would be classified in Canada as free-standing Aboriginal rights not amounting to title. See
K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev.
117 esp. at 138-44; McNeil, 'Traditional Laws and Customs", supra note 52.
14 Mabo, ibid. at 59 [emphasis added].
' Ibid. at 60 [footnote omitted, emphasis added].
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on and is contained within their communal Native title."' The second involves loss of
the Native title itself by surrender of it to the Crown and removal of the land from the
community, thereby placing the land beyond the reach of their laws and customs. In
other words, when an alienation of the first kind takes place the Native title and juris-
diction over it are retained by the community, whereas an alienation of the second
kind involves giving up both title and jurisdiction.
Deane and Gaudron JJ., concurring in the result in Mabo, dealt with inalienability
more briefly, but appear to have arrived at the same conclusions as Brennan J. Refer-
ring to limitations on Native title, they said:
The first limitation relates to alienation. It is commonly expressed as a right of
pre-emption in the Sovereign, sometimes said to flow from "discovery" (i.e. in
the European sense of "discovery" by a European State). The effect of such a
right of pre-emption in the Crown is not to preclude changes to entitlement and
enjoyment within the local native system. It is to preclude alienation outside the
native system otherwise than by surrender to the Crown. "'
Toohey J., also concurring in the result, only touched on inalienability in the context
of extinguishment of Native title, without mentioning whether rights or interests could
be created subject to that title in accordance with Indigenous laws or customs. "'
It therefore appears that the concept of Indian or Native title that emerges from
both Johnson v. M'Intosh and Mabo is a communal right over land that has jurisdic-
tional as well as proprietary attributes. One way that jurisdiction can be exercised is
through Indigenous laws and customs that provide for the creation and enjoyment of
,4' Brennan J. said, ibid. at 61-62 [footnote omitted, emphasis added], that where an Indigenous
people,
as a community, are in possession or are entitled to possession of land under a proprie-
tary native title, their possession may be protected or their entitlement to possession
may be enforced by a representative action brought on behalf of the people or by a sub-
group or individual who sues to protect or enforce rights or interests which are de-
pendent on the communal native title. Those rights and interests are, so to speak,
carved out of the communal native title. A sub-group or individual asserting a native ti-
tle dependent on a communal native tide has a sufficient interest to sue to enforce or
protect the communal title. A communal native title enures for the benefit of the com-
munity as a whole and for the sub-groups and individuals within it who have particular
rights and interests in the community's lands.
,41 Ibid. at 88 [footnote omitted, emphasis added]. See also ibid. at 110: "The enjoyment of the
rights [under Native title] can be varied and dealt with under the traditional law or custom. The rights
are not, however, assignable outside the overall native system. They can be voluntarily extingnished
by surrender to the Crown"
'41 Ibid. at 194. He did say, however, that "inalienability of the title says nothing of the Crown's
power or the nature of the tide. Rather, it describes rights, or restrictions on rights, of settlers and other
potential purchasers" [footnote omitted].
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land rights that depend on and are included within the communal title of the Indige-
nous people in question. Moreover, both the Supreme Court of the United States and
the High Court of Australia have envisaged that land rights created by Indigenous
laws and customs could be acquired by persons who are not members of the commu-
nity if the laws and customs make provision for that. As the Indian or Native title
would be retained by the community, there would be no alienation of that title and so
no violation of the rule that Indian or Native title is inalienable. We have seen that the
Supreme Court of Canada has also held that Aboriginal title is a communal right en-
tailing decision-making authority that appears to be jurisdictional in nature.'" So, as in
the United States and Australia, Aboriginal nations in Canada should be able to make
laws that provide for non-members to hold interests in land within the territory cov-
ered by their Aboriginal title.'1 As this would not involve alienation of their commu-
nal title, it should be permissible under Canadian law.
Acknowledgment of the capacity of Indigenous nations to create rights or inter-
ests in their title lands in accordance with their own laws and customs raises an im-
portant question of enforceability. Would those rights or interests be enforceable only
by whatever mechanisms are available within the Indigenous legal systems them-
selves, or would they be enforceable by Canadian, American, or Australian courts? In
Johnson v. M'Intosh, Marshall C.J. appears to have taken the position that interests
created by an Indian nation under its own laws would not be enforceable in the courts
of the United States. An Indian grant of land, he said, "derives its efficacy from their
will; and, if they choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the
Courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title"'52 This ap-
proach is consistent with Marshall C.J.'s subsequent ruling on the sovereign status of
'oSee supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
"' This is possible under the Nisga'a Final Agreement, online: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
<http:llwww.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsgatnisdexle.pdf> (date accessed: 6 June 2002). In chapter 11
of the agreement, paragraph 44(c), which deals with Nisga'a government, provides that the Nisga'aLisims Government may make laws in respect of "the disposition of an estate or interest ... in any par-
cel of Nisga'a Lands." When the agreement came into force on 11 May 2000, Nisga'a lands became
owned by the Nisga'a Nation in fee simple (c. 3, para. 3), and from that time on the Nisga'a Nationhas had the authority to dispose of the whole of its estate in fee simple or of any lesser estate or inter-
est "to any person" (c. 3, para. 4(b)). Significantly, however, "[a] parcel of Nisga'a Lands does not
cease to be Nisga'a Lands as a result of any change in ownership of an estate or interest in that parcel"(c. 3, para. 5). Apparently a parcel of land will remain Nisga'a land and so continue to be subject toNisga'a jurisdiction even after the Nisga'a Nation has disposed of its fee simple interest (a nice ques-
tion arises, however, as to the nature of the interest the Nisga'a Nation retains in that land after dis-posal of its fee simple). For general discussion, see The Nisga'a Treaty (1998-99) 120 B.C. Studies; T.Molloy, The lVorld is Our Witness: The Historic Journey of the Nisga'a into Canada (Calgary: FifthHouse, 2000). I am grateful to Tom Molloy for his assistance in locating and understanding the rele-
vant sections of the agreement.
12 Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra note 4 at 593.
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the Indian nations in Worcester v. Georgia.'3 In Mabo, however, without concerning
himself with the internal sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples of Australia,'" Bren-
nan J. adopted a somewhat different position on this question of enforceability. He
said:
If alienation of a right or interest in land is a mere matter of the custom ob-
served by the indigenous inhabitants, not provided for by law enforced by a
sovereign power, there is no machinery which can enforce the rights of the al-
ienee. The common law cannot enforce as a proprietary interest the rights of a
putative alienee whose title is not created either under a law which was en-
forceable against the putative alienor at the time of the alienation and thereafter
until the change of sovereignty or under the common law.'55
From this, it appears that a right or interest created, even before Crown sovereignty,
under Indigenous law as opposed to "mere" custom, might be enforceable after sover-
eignty in a common law court. However, the reference to a pre-sovereignty origin of
the right or interest in this passage makes it somewhat uncertain whether a non-
Indigenous alienee would be in the same position.' 6
Case law from the United States and Australia is therefore somewhat inconclusive
on the question of enforceability. At the heart of the matter is the issue of self-
government. On the one hand, respect for Aboriginal decision-making and autonomy
may make it inappropriate for non-Indigenous courts to intervene in this situation,
whether to protect the interests of community members, or of non-members who have
voluntarily acquired rights under the laws of the nation in question. On the other
hand, investors may be reluctant to engage in development on Indigenous lands if the
rights they obtain are not enforceable in non-Indigenous courts. Complex policy is-
sues therefore need to be considered before coming to definite conclusions on this
question of jurisdiction.
,
55 See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
' ' Brennan J. nonetheless held that acquisition of Crown sovereignty over Australia was an act of
state that could not be questioned by the courts: Mabo, supra note 2 at 31-32. Deane and Gaudron JJ.
said the same thing (ibid. at 78-79, 95). See also Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia (1979), 53
A.L.J.R. 403 (H.C.). For related discussion, see D. Ritter, "The 'Rejection of Terra Nuflius' in Mabo:
A Critical Analysis" (1996) 18 Sydney L. Rev. 5.
'
55Mabo, ibid at 59.
See also the quotation supra note 147, from which it appears that subgroups or individuals who
hold rights or interests dependent on a communal Native title could bring an action in an Australian
court to protect those rights or interests against outsiders. Whether they could also bring an action to
enforce the rights or interests against their own community is not so clear.
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Conclusion
In Canada in particular, the inalienability of Aboriginal title has been justified in
part by a recognized need to protect Aboriginal peoples from European settlers as a
matter of policy. While this policy of protection undoubtedly served an important
purpose historically, the paternalism inherent in it has undermined its value as a justi-
fication for the inalienability of Aboriginal title today. There is nonetheless a con-
tinuing need at least to preserve the land bases that Aboriginal peoples have been able
to retain in the face of European colonization. I am therefore not arguing that Abo-
riginal title lands should be freely alienable. Nevertheless, inalienability should not act
as a fetter that prevents Aboriginal nations from developing their lands economically
without surrendering them to the Crown. Consequently, what is needed is a principled
explanation for inalienability that avoids the paternalism of the protection rationale,
and yet acknowledges that the Aboriginal peoples have the authority to engage in
economic development of their lands through the exercise of their inherent right of
self-government.
The incapacity of settlers rationale for the inalienability of Aboriginal title seems
to serve this dual purpose. Political theories and international legal ideas that were
current when the eastern portion of North America was being colonized conceived of
sovereignty as inalienable, at least without the consent of the people concerned. Thejudgments of Chief Justice Marshall in the 1820s and 1830s revealed that the Abo-
riginal nations were sovereign prior to the "discovery" of America by the Europeans,
and that they retained a degree of that sovereignty after colonization. More recent ju-
dicial decisions in Canada and Australia have affirmed that Aboriginal title is a com-
munal right, and that decision-making authority over Aboriginal or Native title lands
rests with the community involved. Aboriginal title therefore has governmental attrib-
utes that make it much more than a property right. It follows from this that private
persons who have no authority to govern cannot acquire it for themselves. Aboriginal
title is only alienable to an entity that does have governmental capacity-in Canada,
another Aboriginal nation or the Crown.
An important practical consequence arises from attributing the inalienability of
Aboriginal title to its governmental aspects. As Aboriginal title is both proprietary andjurisdictional, the two should be severable in much the same way as the proprietary
element of the Crown's title to public lands can be separated from the Crown's sover-
eignty over those lands. When the Crown grants an interest in land, it always retains
its paramount lordship and its jurisdiction because these cannot be acquired by the
grantee. Similarly, alienation of land by an Aboriginal nation that does not terminate
the communal and jurisdictional aspect of that nation's title should be permissible. In
that situation, the alienee could obtain a property interest in the land but would hold
that interest subject to the jurisdiction and laws of the Aboriginal nation. As the nation
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would retain the governmental aspects of its title, no violation of the rule against al-
ienation of that title would occur. Moreover, we have seen that both the Supreme
Court of the United States and the High Court of Australia have in fact accepted this,
as they have held that Indigenous peoples can create interests in land within their ter-
ritories without alienating their Indian or Native title.''
Acknowledgment of the authority of Aboriginal nations to alienate interests in
land that are subject to their Aboriginal title would facilitate economic development
that is subject to Aboriginal control. It would avoid the dilemma of Aboriginal nations
having to surrender their lands to the Crown in order to create third-party interests for
the purpose of development. This approach also affirms the decision-making authority
of Aboriginal nations regarding use of their lands, and acknowledges their responsi-
bility for preserving their lands for future generations. In short, it is a practical and ef-
fective way to move from paternalism to self-determination.
'1 It would, of course, be up to each Aboriginal nation to decide whether to allow such purchases,
and if allowed to define the nature of the rights and interests that could be acquired, through exercise
of their decision-making authority over their lands, which we have seen is an aspect of self-
government. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
[Voi. 47
